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Logic of an Australia-South Africa FTA 
Ann Hodgkinson and André Jordaan  
ustralia, previously a strong supporter of multilateral trade liberalisation, 
recently began negotiating a series of free trade agreements with countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region.  This paper explores, at a conceptual level, the 
question of whether there is an argument for expanding the geographical scope of 
these negotiations to include a link to our neighbouring southern continent of 
Africa.  The argument involves a development of the ‘hub-and-spoke’ framework 
to indicate that a ‘hub-to-hub’ agreement between Australia and South Africa 
would bring benefits both in terms of increased bilateral trade, and provide 
strategic advantages through enhanced investment and intra-industry trade. 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between two countries are a ‘second best’ 
approach to achieving gains from liberalisation of trading arrangements compared 
with multilateral reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers.  However, this 
approach has proliferated in recent years due to difficulties in achieving further 
multilateral reductions after the failure of the Cancun negotiations, and 
particularly in response to the growth in Regional Trading Agreements (RTAs) 
throughout the world.  RTAs have emerged strongly in Europe and the Americas.  
Asian region countries have been late in entering such arrangements but recently 
there has been an upsurge in activity in this region (Lloyd and MacLaren, 2004).   
There is a possibility that, as they proliferate, FTAs will coalesce into a 
tripolar system of trading blocs based on Europe, North America and Asia (Lloyd 
and McLaren, 2004). The economic theory of preferential trading systems or trade 
blocs essentially concerns changes to world economic welfare arising from a move 
to discriminatory trading arrangements.  Welfare change is the net effect of trade 
creation (positive welfare) and trade diversion (negative welfare).  Trade creation 
occurs between members of the bloc as cheaper imports from one member replace 
higher cost local production, such that net welfare of members of the bloc 
increases as all countries benefit from production and allocation efficiencies.  
Trade diversion occurs when lower cost imports from a non-member are replaced 
with higher cost imports from a member, who differentially benefits from the 
reduction in protection, such that net welfare of members and non-members falls.   
It is further assumed that as the number of blocs falls and each bloc becomes 
larger, they can use their market power to raise, or lower more slowly, relative 
tariffs against non-members thus accentuating both negative trade diversion and 
positive trade creation effects.  Consequently, as FTAs coalesce into RTAs, the net 
welfare effect is ambiguous as the number of trading blocs decreases and the 
market power of each bloc increases.  Further, it is argued that the welfare 
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minimising number of blocs is three.  This negative welfare effect however is 
likely to be less if the blocs form with ‘natural’ partners, defined as trading 
partners with low transaction  (transportation and communication) costs, that is 
continental FTAs.  The high tariffs against non-members’ imports will not result 
in significant trade diversion in such cases as this trade would not occur anyway 
due to these high transaction costs (Krugman, 1993).   
Faced with this prediction, countries outside natural trading blocs would be at 
a considerable disadvantage and may suffer significant trade diversion welfare 
losses.  Oceania, Africa and Latin America are in this category.  Even though 
theoretically non-discriminatory tariff reductions would be a better policy for such 
countries (Jones, 1993; Lloyd, 2002; Schiff and Winter, 2003), they will seek to 
counter this effect with bilateral agreements based on mutual interests.  An 
Australian-South African agreement is a possible response to this situation.  This 
paper explores whether it is a feasible option, and discusses the possible sources of 
gains from trade from such a FTA. 
The arguments in favour of an Australian-South African FTA fall into two 
categories, which are evaluated in the following sections.  First, there is statistical 
evidence of a rapid growth in trade values between the two countries.  The rate of 
growth in this trade is higher than that of any of the other countries with which 
Australia has or is considering FTAs, except China.  It can also be shown that 
trade between the two countries is largely complementary.  Australia exports 
predominantly mineral products to South Africa and South African exports to 
Australia are predominantly manufactures. This complementarity creates a 
common interest and highlights the likely market protection role of a FTA. 
Second, it has considerable strategic advantages.  A ‘hub-to-hub’ agreement 
would connect Africa and Asia.  If the ‘rules of origin’ conditions were ever to be 
relaxed, it positions both countries to act as gateways for trade between these two 
continents in the future.  Conversely, while the current situation regarding these 
rules persists, it makes both countries attractive sites for foreign direct investment 
from each other.  A further strategic advantage arises from its potential to 
stimulate intra-industry trade within the passenger motor vehicle (PMV) industry.  
Both countries have relatively high tariff protection for this industry at the 
moment, and both have plans to reduce this in the near future. The PMV varieties 
produced in these countries are complementary, such that a FTA would help each 
industry to expand their exports, thus gaining economies of scale before having to 
face increased international competition in the future. 
These topics are explored within the hub-and-spoke framework developed 
below.  A statistical analysis of existing trade, focusing on the potential trade 
creating and trade diversion effects likely to arise from such a FTA is provided, 
and the strategic considerations through intra-industry trade and enhanced 
investment are analysed.  While it is not possible here to develop a full statistical 
modelling of the net welfare benefits related to an Australian-South African FTA, 
the case is made that, at least conceptually, there is a logic to such an agreement 
and that it should be explored further as a policy option. 
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Framework for an Australian-South African FTA 
Economic analysis of FTAs emphasises evaluation of net welfare benefits likely to 
arise from such an agreement, where the net benefits are the value of the trade 
creating effects minus any trade diversion effects.  The natural trading partners 
theory postulates that the negative trade diversion effect will be less if trading 
agreements form between geographically close partners.  Baier and Bergstrand 
(2004) argue that logical or ‘natural’ partners in FTAs are determined by a 
combination of comparative advantage and geographical features.  A comparison 
of the economic features of Australia and South Africa are shown in Table 1.   
Table 1:  Economic Comparison:  Australia and South Africa, 2003  
 Australia South Africa 
GDP ($US) Billions 518.4 159.9 
GDP per capita ($US) 29,000 3,503 
Population (millions) 19.9 45.3 
GDP growth (10 year av.)  3.8% 2.7% 
Population growth (10 yr av.) 1.2% p.a. 1.7% p.a. 
Population density per sq. km. 2.5 35.1 
Unemployment rate 6% 31% 
Capital – Labour ratio* ($US) 9,246 1,472 
Ranking in Economic Remoteness** 2 3 
* Calculated as consumption of fixed capital divided by labour force. 
** Australia and South Africa are ranked second and third most remote countries in the sample of 
countries considered by Ewing and Battersby (2005).  Remoteness is measured as the percentage 
of world GDP occurring within an increasing kilometre distance from a country. 
Sources: World Book (2004); CIA World Factbook (2004); International Monetary Fund (2004). 
It could be argued that Australia and South Africa are not natural trading 
partners.  They are over 11,000 Km apart, although not an abnormally different 
separation than for several other countries negotiating FTAs with Australia.  Both 
are only medium-sized economies and hence bilateral trade flows are not likely to 
be large.  However, both are relatively remote from the major world economic 
centres and hence could be excluded from emerging trading blocs, suggesting that 
they should look for alternative means of enhancing their future trade growth.  
Futher, they have different factor endowments with South Africa being relatively 
labour intensive and Australia relatively capital intensive.  This indicates that 
bilateral trade would be consistent with national comparative advantages.   
Empirical studies do not support the ‘natural partners’ hypothesis.  Neither 
size of existing trade flows or geographic proximity is necessarily associated with 
welfare effects (Schiff and Winter, 2003).  As Bhagwati (1999:14-15) points out, 
trade creation/diversion effects depend not only on the size of trade flows but also 
on the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and non-member imports.  
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With high substitution, trade diversion will be significant regardless of existing 
trade levels while low substitution rates enhance welfare benefits from trade 
creation even if existing trade is low.  Further, agreements between geographically 
close partners will not generate increased welfare if the countries have had past 
hostilities, while agreements between distant countries with shared interests can 
promote trade.  Each proposition needs to be analysed on a case-by-case basis.   
In recent years, both Australia and South Africa, despite a general preference 
for multilateral trade liberalisation, have been interested in bilateral agreements.  
Much of this activity has been a response to the proliferation of agreements 
throughout the world involving their major trading partners, and a fear of being 
excluded from the merging blocs because of their size and remoteness (Bailey and 
Perry, 1993).  In addition, in a time of coalescing trading blocs, each country has 
needed to act to safeguard its existing markets against any potential future closure 
inherent in a tripolar bloc world trading system (Mansfield, 1998).  This idea 
gained currency in the early 1990s, after the US abandoned its strong adherence to 
non-discriminatory trade policy and began negotiating bilateral trade agreements.   
South Africa plays a key role in the African Union and on a regional level in 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) which includes 13 other 
African countries mainly located in the southern and eastern regions.  It took a 
leading role in establishing the New Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD) which aims to unite all African countries and promote the economic 
renewal of the continent.  It is thus envisaged that over the long run the whole of 
Africa would be united, enhancing the potential of pro-active action.  South Africa 
is also a member of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), along with 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland.  SACU has a FTA with the European 
Union and since December 2004, has engaged in a preferential trading agreement 
with MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia) and 
is presently negotiating a FTA with the United States (Schiff and Winters, 2003).  
Australia has preferred multilateral trade negotiations and remains committed 
to APEC’s goal of free and open trade and investment in the Asia Pacific region.  
However, it is also willing to consider FTAs with other significant individual 
economies or regional groupings likely to deliver faster and deeper liberalisation.   
It has a comprehensive Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement with New 
Zealand and allows preferential access to goods from the South Pacific Islands and 
from Papua New Guinea.  Australia has developed a number of FTAs in recent 
years with Thailand, Singapore and the US.  According to the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT, 2005), Australia is currently negotiating 
agreements with China, Japan, Malaysia and UAE.  
Figure 1 maps the growing involvement of Australia and South Africa in 
bilateral and regional trading agreements.  As discussed below, the Australia-
South Africa FTA should offer trade creation benefits arising from both inter-
industry and intra-industry trade.  The higher growth rates and per capita incomes 
in Australia provide an opportunity for South African firms to expand their 
markets and provide badly needed employment opportunities to local people.  
Even if the Asian and African ‘hub-and-spoke’ arrangements were to coalesce into 
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regional blocs incorporating Australia and South Africa respectively, there would 
be logic in pursuing an agreement for strategic purposes.  An agreement linking 
these two blocs would enhance the importance of each partner as trading ‘hubs’, 
making them attractive locations for investment, and giving them ‘first mover’ 
advantages in becoming gateways for regional trade flows between the two blocs.  
Figure 1:  Australian and South African Trading Agreements 
 
 
Notes: SACU = Southern African Customs Union:  South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland. 
 SADU = Southern African Development Community:  South Africa, Angola, Botswana, 
Dem. Rep. of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 MERCOSUR = Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia. 
 UAE = United Arab Emirates. 
Source: Adapted from Schiff and Winters (2003:76), and Lloyd and MacLaren (2004). 
Bilateral Trade 
South Africa is currently Australia’s largest and most dynamic trading partner on 
the African continent.  Bilateral relations already exist and both countries have a 
history of productive cooperation across a wide range of issues.  These include the 
Commonwealth, World Trade Organisation, Cairns Group, Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, the New World Wine 
Producers Group, the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds, fisheries 
protection, customs cooperation, human rights, migration and people smuggling, 
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law enforcement, and defence relations.  Another forum for economic and trade 
cooperation between Australia and South Africa is the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association for Regional Cooperation (DFAT, 2005).  Thus the two countries 
have a commonality of interest and open communication channels that would 
facilitate development of a FTA.   













90/91 178,099  99,285  78,813  
91/92 226,144 26.97 113,525 14.34 112,618 42.89 
92/93 334,242 47.80 191,632 68.80 142,610 26.63 
1994 431,877 29.21 288,280 50.43 143,597 0.69 
1995 658,874 52.56 365,424 26.76 293,451 104.36 
1996 945,922 43.57 453,299 24.05 492,624 67.87 
1997 1,020,735 7.91 472,638 4.27 548,097 11.26 
1998 1,064,495 4.29 561,292 18.75 503,203 -8.19 
1999 912,603 -14.27 640,307 14.08 272,296 -45.89 
2000 1,262,260 38.31 852,116 33.08 410,143 50.62 
2001 1,298,206 2.85 858,711 0.77 439,496 7.16 
2002 1,295,620 -0.19 965,887 12.48 329,734 -24.97 
2003 1,324,813 2.25 1,135,252 17.53 189,561 -42.51 
2004 1,589,100 19.90 1,249,964 10.10 339,136 78.91 
Source:  DFAT (2004; 2005)  
Over the past five years, total trade between these two countries grew by 
approximately 10 per cent per year and, in 2004, it was valued at $A2.8 billion 
(see Table 2).  In addition, bilateral exports of services from Australia and South 
Africa were $A267million and A$275million respectively in 2004 (DFAT, 2005).  
Taking a long term perspective, the average quarterly rate of growth of trade 
between the two countries since 1980 was 2.4 per cent.  This growth rate is the 
same as that of Australian trade with Malaysia, and higher than that of trade with 
Thailand (1.5 per cent), UAE (1.7 per cent) and Singapore (2.04 per cent), all of 
which are involved in preferential trade negotiations with Australia.  
This growth was partly due to the lifting of sanctions but South Africa is also 
purposely moving away from commodity-based products to more diversified 
exports including manufactured products.  Current exports such as passenger 
motor vehicles (PMV) were not exported before the sanctions and this trade is thus 
not merely the result of re-opening old markets.  South Africa’s trade is still under 
its full potential and new trading relationships could contribute to filling this gap.   
South Africa is Australia’s 16th most important export destination and its 24th 
most important source of imports.  The composition of trade largely reflects each 
country’s comparative advantages.  Australian main exports to South Africa are 
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confidential items and special transactions (particularly alumina), coal, crude 
petroleum, nickel and meat, with some manufactured items such as PMV, 
machinery and equipment, aircraft and parts.  Australia’s imports from South 
Africa were mainly manufactures such as PMVs (mostly BMW series 3 vehicles), 
furniture, pig iron, televisions and specialised machinery.  In 2004, South Africa 
was the fourth largest exporter of PMVs into Australia.  It was also the fifth 
largest source of arms and ammunition (DFAT, 2005).  Increasing trade volumes 
indicate a potential for renegotiating the trading relationship between the two 
countries, with the implication that trade creating welfare benefits will increase in 
future.  Many of the items imported into each country are also produced locally.  
Thus a FTA would have trade creating effects in most of the major traded 
products, where imports could replace any remaining inefficient local production. 
The extent to which these positive welfare effects may be offset by negative 
trade diversion effects depends on the relative tariff position of these two countries 
against the rest of the world (ROW).  Both countries have been involved in 
programs of multilateral tariff reductions from relatively high post-war protection 
regimes.  South Africa now has zero tariffs on most products imported from 
Australia, and thus little trade diversion would result from a FTA in these sectors.  
Both countries still have tariffs averaging just under five per cent on manufactured 
products, but with higher levels on PMV, textiles, clothing, footwear and leather, 
wood and paper products, and furniture.  Thus, a FTA may result in a small trade 
diversion effect in these sectors, which predominantly would occur in Australia if 
growing South African manufactures displaced similar products from other 
countries.  The impacts on PMV trade are discussed in the next section.  Countries 
also need to consider any negative impacts that could arise from the loss of 
customs revenue if they rely on it as a source of government income (de Melo et 
al, 1993).  This is not an issue for Australia, where it is only 2.4 per cent of total 
government revenue (Commonwealth Government Budget Paper No. 1, 2005-
2006) or South Africa where customs duty was only 3.6 per cent of total tax 
revenue (Schiff and Winter, 2003:95). 
Overall, an initial evaluation of a FTA between Australia and South Africa 
would indicate that it would result in a positive net welfare effect.  This effect may 
be small as trade volumes, except for the two major export items, and existing 
tariffs are relatively low.  However, this initial assessment does not include effects 
that may arise from strategic issues associated with intra-industry trade and 
investment considerations, as discussed below. 
Strategic Considerations 
Intra-industry Trade 
The general findings outlined above are modified if trade involves imperfectly 
competitive goods.  In a situation where there are many import-competing goods 
produced with economies of scale, several effects can arise from a FTA.  
Production of some goods will expand as the partner’s market is taken over and 
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firms obtain cost reductions with scale, consequently consumer prices fall.  The 
competing firms in that market cease production as they become non-competitive.  
These two effects generate trade creation welfare benefits from reduced prices for 
consumers in both partner countries arising from the elimination of protection and 
reduced production costs.  Profits, however, move from the less successful firms 
to those in the more competitive country.  Imports from the rest of the world 
(ROW) may be reduced if they are displaced by the FTA partner’s lower cost 
production, due to trade diversion in the first country and trade displacement by 
domestic production in the successful country.  The extent to which these negative 
welfare effects arise depends on how significantly the relative tariff between the 
FTA partners and the ROW rises, thus suppressing the benefits from the 
economies of scale cost reductions.  This depends on the elasticity of substitution 
between domestic production and ROW imports (Corden, 1999:196-197). 
For a FTA to be viable, each country must have firms that can benefit from 
these economies of scale and can expand into each other’s markets, such that both 
countries achieve some increase in production, employment and profits (Baldwin 
and Venables, 1995, Krugman, 1995).  The likelihood of this increases with 
trading of differentiated products.  Consumers in each country buy a number of 
varieties, due to differences in tastes.  Trade thus reflects specialisation advantages 
from decreasing returns to scale rather than differences in the factor endowments 
of each country.  Of the models based on imperfect competition, horizontal 
differentiation is relevant in this scenario.  There are two main approaches to 
horizontal product differentiation, namely the ‘love of variety’ approach 
(Krugman, 1979, Helpman, 1981) and the ‘ideal-variety’ approach (Lancaster, 
1966; 1980).  The first assumes that consumers value variety and prefer a larger 
variety of goods.  Under the second, a certain specification of a product rather than 
the availability of a range of goods is preferred by consumers.  Each consumer has 
a most preferred or ideal product.  Thus, even if similar products are manufactured 
locally, some consumers will prefer imported models.  In the ‘love-of-variety’ 
approach goods enter the utility function symmetrically and an increase in 
available varieties increases the welfare of all consumers.  In the ‘ideal-variety’ 
approach, goods enter the utility function asymmetrically and an increase in 
variety does not benefit those previously consuming their ideal variety.  Thus, for 
PMV, imports and exports will occur simultaneously in the same market segment 
making some consumers better off while others may not gain (Sichei, 2005). 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in South Africa developed an 
Integrated Manufacturing Strategy in 2002 because manufacturing was regarded 
as a catalyst for accelerated growth, increased exports and employment.  South 
Africa’s competitive advantage in PMV is based on its ability to operate with short 
or low-volume runs, competitive tooling costs and a high degree of manufacturing 
flexibility.  As a right-hand-drive (RHD) country, it has a further cost advantage 
when exporting to similar countries such as the UK, Australia and New Zealand 
(DTI, 2002).  The main PMV producers are Ford, Volkswagen, Toyota and BMW.  
Ford (S.A.) is about to commence exports of the Focus model to Australia and 
New Zealand.  It also manufactures the Ranger (or Courier) and Drifter for those 
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markets.  Volkswagen (S.A.) produces the Golf model and has been positioned as 
its sole supplier to the Asia-Pacific region.  The Focus and the Golf compete in the 
medium size market segment.  South Africa currently predominantly exports 
BMW series 3 vehicles to Australia, US, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Taiwan.  In 2003, it exported 21,254 units into the Australian prestige 
market segment.  Toyota exported 8,000 Corollas to Australia in 2003 and a 
substantial increase is expected in 2004 and 2005 (Anon, 2003).  Australia 
received 15 per cent of the South African PMV exports in 2003 (DTI, 2004).  
The Australian PMV industry now largely produces for the large car market 
segment.  Ford produces the Falcon and Territory, both of which are exported to 
South Africa.  Holden produces the Commodore and Lexcon, while Mitsubishi 
produces the Magna.  Neither firm currently exports to South Africa.  Toyota 
produces the Avalon and Camry 6 in the large car segment and the Camry 4 —the 
only medium car now produced in Australia.  Both versions of the Camry have 
substantial exports.  Australia also produces small volumes of the Ford Fairlane, 
LTD, Holden Statesman and Caprice, and the Holden Monaro since 2001 in the 
prestige market segment, but none of these are currently exported (DITR, 2005). 
Analysis of PMV production and trade has to consider global strategies of car 
companies in addition to comparative costs.  Australian and South African PMV 
producers are subsidiaries of global corporations and are affected by their parent’s 
global positioning.  Firms, faced with large economies of scale, high R&D costs, 
and steep learning curves tend to adopt a strategic trade position, involving 
demands for both access to export markets and protection of their home markets 
(Milner and Joffie, 1989), which helps to explain the relatively high tariffs in these 
sectors.  Their support for FTAs is mixed.  A FTA is opposed if it is likely to 
result in direct competition to local production but supported if it is likely to open 
up new markets for locally developed and differentiated models (Hoy, 2003). 
Further, regional production rationalisation by global motor corporations is 
likely to influence their attitudes to trading agreements.  For example, under 
Toyota’s previous (prior to 1999) multinational strategy, both its Australian and 
South African subsidiaries produced Corollas.  As a result of regional 
rationalisation Australia now imports Corollas from Japan and, since 2003, from 
South Africa.  It exports Camrys and Avalons to New Zealand, the Middle East, 
South Africa, South East Asia and Oceania (Toyota Global website, 2006).  Thus 
an Australian-South African FTA would be consistent with this strategy. 
Small cars represent the largest segment of the Australian market with over 
265,000 units in 2004 (DITR, 2005) imported mainly from Japan, Republic of 
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and other Asian countries.  Increased imports from 
South Africa would normally have a trade diversion effect against these countries.  
However, because Australia has, or is currently negotiating FTAs with many of 
these countries, a FTA with South Africa would prevent trade discrimination 
against its exports, rather than create trade diversion in its favour in most cases —
under the circumstances, significant trade diversion might occur only against small 
cars from the Republic of Korea. 
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Two other South African PMV producers, Ford and Volkswagen, are 
planning to export to Australia.  These models would compete against locally 
produced Camry 4 series cars and should produce some small trade creation 
welfare effects.  Given that Toyota is the only remaining Australian producer of 
medium-size cars, it could be assumed that Australia is relatively inefficient in this 
segment.  However, since 2001, over 60 per cent of Australian production has 
been exported (DITR, 2005) suggesting otherwise.  Thus increased competition in 
the medium car market should have trade creating welfare benefits with 
distribution of profits being determined by the relative strengths of each producer. 
Australia also has competitive advantages in the large car segment.  Since 
2001, almost 20 per cent of production has been exported.  South Africa does not 
produce in this segment.  Toyota and Ford are currently the main exporters to 
South Africa, although a FTA may encourage Holden and Mitsubishi to also 
commence exports.  An expansion of production would create welfare benefits for 
Australia if prices fall with economies of scale.  Australian manufacturers have a 
cost advantage in being RHD producers and the transport cost effect would be 
minimised as the alternative producers in Europe, Japan and the US have to cover 
similar distances.  Thus trade diversion should not be significant.  In South Africa 
this market segment is probably small because low average income levels suggest 
only a small proportion of the population can afford large and prestige cars.   
South Africa exports of PMV into Australia are currently predominantly the 
BMW series 3 vehicles in the prestige segment.  Australian imports almost 90 per 
cent of this segment and has no exports.  There may be a small trade creating 
welfare effect against local prestige car production, but the main effect would be 
trade diversion against other prestige car imports, which are currently coming 
particularly from Germany and the US.  Due to BMW’s global production strategy 
(BMW website, 2006), the South African BMWs would not compete against 
German production of this brand, but would of course compete against models 
from other German and European manufacturers.  Trade diversion effects would 
be reduced by RHD cost savings and by lower transport costs from South Africa 
to Australia.  South Africa would also benefit from trade creation from economies 
of scale and cost savings from expanded production leading to price reductions.  
The welfare gains and losses discussed above are summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3: Possible Welfare Effects of an Australia-South Africa FTA 
from PMV trade. 
 Production with Trade Creation Benefits Diversion Possibilities  
Segment South Africa Australia South Africa Australia 
Small Corolla   Some 
Medium Golf, Focus Camry 4 Some Minor 
Large  Camry 6, Territory Minor  
Prestige BMW   Minor 




If both countries already have low tariffs on most traded goods, a FTA can deliver 
benefits from improvements in regulations on things such as investment, trade in 
services (banking, financial services, transport), protection of intellectual property, 
non-tariff measures, the settlement of disputes, health and safety, and product 
standards.  Reducing and harmonising regulations will generate a range of benefits 
likely to stimulate investment flows between the partners leading to opportunities, 
not only for FDI, but also co-production, joint marketing and the transfer of 
technology (Weintraub, 1993, Wonnacott, 2001). 
These benefits are heightened if the two partners in a FTA are also ‘hubs’ 
within their own regional trading areas.  The strategic benefits will vary depending 
on the rules of origin conditions contained in each hub’s arrangements with its 
other FTA spoke partners (Atkins, 1993).  If these do not allow the trading of 
goods originating in one spoke through the hub to its other spokes, then the ‘hub-
to-hub’ arrangements will stimulate FDI and joint ventures located in the partner 
hub.  Thus, for example, should South African firms wish to access the US and 
Asian markets already involved in FTAs with Australia, they will need to invest in 
production facilities in Australia.  The reduction in regulation and harmonisation 
of standards negotiated within the Australia-South Africa FTA will assist this flow 
of investment and would generate economic benefit to Australia.  Conversely, the 
FTA would facilitate an inflow of investment to South Africa from Australian 
firms seeking to access the wider African and EU markets. 
Investment in the two countries might also realign, reflecting their different 
factor endowments.  Labour intensive manufacturers could move to South Africa 
and export back into Australia, as an alternative to the current movement into 
Asian countries.  This trend could increase over time as Asian labour costs rise.  
Conversely, African processors of raw materials may find Australia a more 
attractive location, contributing to the current exports of minerals and metals.  
Such changes would be efficiency enhancing. 
Should the conditions affecting the existing FTAs already entered into by 
each hub country allow the re-export of products through the partner country into 
its ‘spoke’ markets, then this FTA would have the added advantage of converting 
Australia into a gateway for African exports into Asia, and make South Africa a 
gateway for Asian exports into Africa.  Achieving this type of change to the rules 
of origin conditions is problematic, and thus the initial strategic benefits will 
largely be through FDI as discussed above. Some analyses of export-led growth 
indicate that much of the benefit arises through the nexus between trade and 
investment rather than exports in themselves (Greenaway and Sapsford, 1994). 
Conclusion 
Both Australia and South Africa are currently involved in developing a series of 
regional FTA/RTAs and are developing into hubs within their own regions.  It is 
argued that a FTA joining these two hubs would have strategic advantages in 
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addition to the usual net welfare trade creation benefits by linking Asia and Africa.  
In part, the regional gateway role is an opportunistic advantage from being the 
first pairing between the two regions based on common geopolitical interests.  
This gateway role will initially be manifest in an increase in investment facilitated 
by improved regulatory environments negotiated in the FTA.  It also positions 
both countries to take advantage of any future liberalisation of trading rules 
relating to the re-export of products within FTAs. 
While the initial trade creating benefits may not be large, the rapid growth in 
bilateral trade indicates that these should increase in the future.  Furthermore, a 
FTA would have some interesting impacts on both countries’ PMV industries.  
Both industries currently comprise subsidiaries of global motor companies that are 
attempting to establish their own positions within the world market.  Each has 
specialised in a different market segment, providing an opportunity to expand into 
each others market and thus gain economies of scale.  This provides the PMV 
manufacturers in both countries with an opportunity to expand their export 
markets without any substantial threat to existing production and employment. 
The actual value of the welfare effects associated with an Australia-South 
Africa FTA can only be measured through a complex modelling exercise.  Prior to 
any modelling, a conceptual analysis is required to set its parameters, which has 
been attempted here.  Computerised general equilibrium (CGE) models as widely 
used to evaluate trading agreements predominantly incorporate perfect 
competition and constant returns to scale.  To capture the effects highlighted in 
this paper, modifications to include imperfect competition and decreasing returns 
to scale within the PMV industry would be required.  If it is considered that the 
conceptual argument mounted here warrants placing a FTA between Australia and 
South Africa on the policy agenda, such a modelling exercise would be the next 
step in developing this proposition. 
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